Mali’s junta solidifies power by suspending political activities
Bolstered by its successes against insurgents, the Malian military junta is tightening its control by shutting out the opposition
Upon seizing power in 2023, Mali’s military junta promised to return to democratic rule. However, in a reversal of its commitments, it has consolidated its control, banned political parties and extended its authority.
Despite widespread calls for a transition to civilian governance, the junta has indefinitely postponed elections, leaving the population disillusioned and disengaged from the political process.
Critics lament the junta’s abandonment of its pledge, and a Code for Africa investigation has uncovered a deliberate strategy to diminish public interest in politics. Focusing on successful counterterrorism operations, the junta has diverted attention away from democratic aspirations, tightening its grip on power.
According to an election schedule announced in September 2023, the first round of voting was to be held on 04 February 2024 and the second on 18 February 2024. The regime has, however, postponed the elections without providing an updated electoral calendar.
This postponement is the second in three years. During that time, the country experienced two military coups. The last time the country held presidential elections was in 2018.
On 10 April 2024, the government discarded all pretence about returning the country to democratic rule when it announced a ban on all political activities in the country. A government spokesperson said the junta took the decision ‘to maintain public order’.
Elections postponement and diminished interest in politics
In a statement to the press on 25 September 2023, the junta blamed ‘technical issues’ for the delay in holding the elections. It also argued that the delay was necessary to allow for the adoption of new constitutional provisions in the electoral law and to increase the time between presidential elections.
It then accused a French-based international tech company, IDEMIA, of holding the administrative census database ‘hostage’ since March 2023 due to unpaid bills. IDEMIA provided the former government with a civil identification system called RAVEC.
According to a Reuters article, an IDEMIA spokesperson said the company has no contract with Mali’s interim authorities and confirmed that its service had been shut down due to outstanding invoices.
The government’s Facebook page largely received a positive response to the announcement of the delay on social media. In one instance, 39 Facebook accounts used the copy-paste technique to amplify the statement. The posts received 1,777 interactions and were mainly shared from accounts based in Mali. Most comments supported the decision and said the emphasis should be on security rather than playing politics.
A trend analysis of mentions of the words and phrases — ‘election’, ‘ electoral reforms’, ‘Mali’, ‘transitional government’ or ‘transitional authorities’ — on Facebook pages and groups indicated that the postponement of elections did not attract as much traction as other events in 2023. This suggests the junta has effectively redirected public conversations away from statecraft.
Similarly, on X, the peak of election-related mentions did not take place when the postponement was announced. This implies that the public did not have a strong reaction to it and also suggests growing support for the junta’s anti-Western sentiments.
An outraged opposition
Although the interest in politics among Malians appeared to have waned, opposition parties in the country expressed outrage over the postponement of the elections. However, they muted their disapproval online.
For instance, on Facebook, the country’s most-used social media platform, there were few mentions of Parti social-démocrate Africain (PSDA) and its leader Ismaël Sacko, focusing on the delay in elections. Between 05 March 2023 and 29 February 2024, only 77 posts from Facebook pages mentioned PDSA or its leader, with a total interaction rate of 2,797, which shows minimal reach.
The peak in mentions of PDSA and its founder was between 05 and 11 March 2023, when Sacko called out the transition government on the postponement of the referendum scheduled for 19 March 2023.
Mentions of the political party Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et l’Indépendance (SADI) and its leader Oumar Mariko, had significantly larger traction than PSDA, with Facebook page mentions of 989 posts and 435,251 interactions. Unlike the PSDA Facebook traction analysis, the peak period for mentions of SADI and its leader was from 24 to 30 September 2023, when the elections were postponed. However, information disorder significantly influenced this traction, with posts for and against the party being inauthentically amplified online in a coordinated manner.
Other opposition parties that denounced the junta’s unilateral decision to postpone elections did not receive much traction online either. These included the Movement of June 5-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP) opposition coalition and the Democratique League for Change, which expressed its ‘disappointment’, adding that it ‘disapproved and unequivocally condemned’ the junta’s ‘attempt to take the Malian democracy hostage’. The Yelema party said the move showed a ‘lack of foresight’, as well as the authorities’ ‘incompetence’ and their ‘refusal to honour their commitments’.
Opposition party Parti Pour la Renaissance Nationale (Parena) said holding elections is a matter of ‘political will’ and that some of the technical reasons cited by the junta could have been ‘avoided’. Mali’s former justice minister, Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, accused the junta on social media of ‘trying to make up for its fault and inability to settle public affairs’ by blaming the postponement mainly on the French company, IDEMIA, providing civil identity services’.
‘Nothing explains the postponement of the presidential election,’ Amadou Koïta, president of Mali’s Yeleen-Kura Socialist Party, told Voice of America.
Coordination des Mouvements, Associations et Sympathisants de l’Imam Mahmoud Dicko (CMAS) — an influential Islamist opposition group in the north that brings together political parties and civil society organisations — also frowned at the postponement of the election. Its general coordinator, Youssouf Daba Diawara, issued a statement contesting the ‘unilateral decision which de facto refers to another extension of the transition’. He added that CMAS had decided to mobilise all its activists, supporters, and others to organise ‘patriotic actions as soon as possible to demand the establishment of a civilian transition’. Further highlighting the junta’s oppressive tendencies, in early March, it accused CMAS of destabilising the transitional authorities and ordered the group’s dissolution.
Counterterrorism
Since the announcement of the postponement, the ‘transitional government’ has joined a new mutual defence agreement, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). It further strengthened its position by retaking a key outpost in the north of the country, upended the dialogue for peace and reconciliation via the Algiers process, and left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
In mid-September 2023, Malian president Assimi Goïta signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter, a security pact that established the AES. Thereafter, he posted on X that it aims to ‘establish an architecture of collective defence and mutual assistance for the benefit of our populations’.
The charter emphasises countering the threat of terrorism in the three countries.
In a fight for control over the sprawling north of its territory, Mali has been embroiled in conflict since 2012 . This has manifested in the form of various political armed groups, ethnic-based movements, militants, and transnational criminal networks.
On 07 November 2023, the government carried out a series of drone strikes on Kidal. The mayor told the Associated Press that 14 people were among the victims, including the deputy mayor and a local councillor. Other residents said children were also killed in photos shared with Le Monde.
The government stated that it used drones to target terrorist positions.
A week later, Kidal fell to the junta with reported support from Russian-backed Wagner Group fighters. This took place just a month after UN peacekeepers departed from nearby bases as part of a forced withdrawal directed by the transitional government in Bamako.
On 15 November 2023, Moscow extended congratulations to Mali’s military government for recapturing the Kidal region from the ethnic Tuareg separatists, the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). According to RT, the Russian foreign ministry praised the victory as a testament to the ‘impressive growth’ in the combat proficiency of the Malian armed forces.
On Facebook, at least 481 posts were linked to the Malian army’s reconquest of Kidal. These posts generated 215,092 interactions. There were 3,405 mentions of this event on X, with 27,027 engagements and 1,383,057 views. Most of the accounts posted on Facebook and X are based in Mali.
After the recapture of Kidal, media outlets such as the Africa Report and RFI amplified the claim that Wagner forces had hoisted the group’s flag on the fort in Kidal.
In contrast, several social media accounts, such as @CheickIbtidiani, have published original videos disputing the controversy and showing the Malian flag flying over the fort. This claim generated 1,772 mentions on X, with 11,525 engagements and 968,331 views.
This win contributes to the junta’s claim that it needs to prioritise counterterrorism — even though there have been substantive allegations of civilian casualties and abuse. Before the junta’s victory, CMA’s hold on the city had presented an issue of governmental sovereignty, and taking back the area was a symbolic win.
‘Today, our armed and security forces have taken over Kidal. Our mission is not complete,’ Goïta said on X. ‘I recall it consists of recovering and securing the integrity of the territory, without any exclusion, in accordance with the resolution of the [UN] security council.’
In late January, after retaking Kidal, the junta ended its 2015 deal with the Tuareg separatists who largely make up CMA. In a speech broadcast on state television, military government spokesperson colonel Abdoulaye Maïga said there had been an ‘increasing number of unfriendly acts, instances of hostility, and interference in Mali’s internal affairs’ by Algiers, which brokered the accord.
CMA said it was not surprised by the decision.
‘We have been expecting it since they brought in Wagner, chased out MINUSMA [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali] and started hostilities by attacking our positions on the ground,’ CMA’s spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane said to Reuters. ‘We knew that the aim was to terminate the agreement.’
A climate of suppression
Bolstered by successes against extremist and separatist groups, as well as widespread apathy for politics in the country, the junta is going after its critics and the opposition. Critics that speak out do so in a climate of suppression. CIVICUS, an organisation dedicated to strengthening civil society, has said that, ‘activism and free speech are under siege in Mali.’
CIVICUS noted that in June 2023 a court shut down the opposition party PSDA after finding it guilty of ‘disturbing public order’ and attacking national sovereignty. In December 2023, the authorities dissolved the Observatory for Elections & Good Governance and this March it shut down the Association of Pupils and Students of Mali, with Human Rights Watch noting that the association is the fourth organisation to be dissolved in less than four months.
Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher for Human Rights Watch told CfA that the government in Mali ‘has restricted fundamental freedoms.’
‘The real issue is that in the name of the fight against terrorism, government forces are committing serious human rights abuses,’ Allegrozzi said.
The online information manipulation campaigns targeting opposition parties, including PSDA, reflect this suppression. Although the opposition groups are not pro-government, they carefully avoid a public relationship with CMA, which the government has linked to terrorist groups.
‘They are very careful with their words,’ said Dougoukolo Alpha Oumar Ba Konaré, a psychologist and academic at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations in Paris. The opposition groups want to avoid being branded as jihadists and are nervous about backlash. ‘The government is quite popular, and people adhere to the narrative,’ Ba Konaré said.
In some cases, Facebook posts have associated opposition leaders and opposing political parties with CMA, without providing evidence. For example, on 23 September 2023, a day before the announcement of the postponement of elections, nine Facebook pages used the copy-paste technique to amplify coordinated messages about claims by the military defence collective (CMD) that opposition leader Mariko was siding with CMA and attacking the transitional government.
Meanwhile, the junta has arrested critics and banned and threatened opposition parties. On social media there has been little traction about the election delays and the political oppression, demonstrating both that the junta has dramatically highlighted security and counterterrorism and that there is fear of speaking out.
Quitting ECOWAS
Together with collapsing the peace deal, on 28 January 2024, in a joint announcement, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (the AES countries) declared that they were leaving ECOWAS without delay. The regional bloc had been encouraging the leaders of all three countries — all of which are under control of military juntas — to hold elections.
‘The delay of the elections gives the military more time in power,’ said Baye Abdou, a Dakar-based journalist and analyst. ‘And it raises the question of when these elections will be organised, especially as a rather important event has taken place: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have withdrawn from ECOWAS, freeing themselves at the same time from the demands of the sub-regional institution in terms of respecting the transition periods defined in full cooperation with it.’
The triumvirate accused ECOWAS of betraying its founding principles, ‘inhumane’ sanctions, and failing to support their fight against ‘terrorism and insecurity’.
Together with Mali, Niger had experienced heavy sanctions in response to its military coups. The sanctions have devastated civilians in both countries, prompting inflation to rise and doubling the cost of household necessities.
The departure from ECOWAS has implications for the deteriorating human rights climate, depriving citizens of seeking accountability through the ECOWAS community court of justice. It also signals a wider disinterest in the democratic norms that ECOWAS promotes.
In early February, Mali announced that it would not abide by the ECOWAS treaty withdrawal period of one year. In a letter to ECOWAS, Mali’s foreign ministry said the country was ‘no longer bound’ by the time constraints. Instead, it will exit immediately.
Frustrated by the sanctions, Malians celebrated the decision with scenes of supporters holding signs reading ‘Down with ECOWAS’ in the streets and on social media. Media outlets have published articles quoting civilians who supported the junta’s departure, but CfA did not detect significant social media activity on the topic.
The government did not respond to an email requesting an interview about election delays.
Consolidating power
In 2020, the junta sacked the democratically elected government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta . In 2021, the coup leader, Goïta again expelled the interim government led by president Bah Ndaw and prime minister Moctar Ouane and began to consolidate his power. It was the second coup in a year and the third within 10 years. By 2023, Goïta’s government had pushed out France, Mali’s colonial ruler, and welcomed a new security partner, Russia.
In June 2023, Malians voted on a referendum that introduced a new constitution, which the junta — under sanctions and pressure from ECOWAS — said would set the path for the 2024 elections. Even as the electoral body alleged it passed with 97% in favour, opponents criticised the referendum, saying it gives the head of state outsized power. Tuareg rebels called on their supporters to reject or boycott the referendum, claiming they were not included in the review process. During the referendum, electoral agents were reportedly abducted and electoral material burned. Much of the vote did not occur in the north due to security concerns. The changes greatly empower the president: they give the head of state the right to hire and fire the prime minister and cabinet members. The modifications also make the government answerable to the president and not to parliament.
This report was written by CfA iLAB investigative fellow Amanda Sperber, with contributions by CfA iLAB senior investigative data analyst Peter Kimani. It was edited and reviewed by iLAB insights manager Nicholas Ibekwe, iLAB copy editor Theresa Mallinson and iLAB managing editor Athandiwe Saba.
