Gift Horse: Russia’s African aid diplomacy

This report is part of our analysis of Africa-focused Russian influence operations designed to shape public support for Russia.

The war in Ukraine has disrupted agricultural exports and fuel supplies across the Black Sea region, triggering widespread global cost increases and food/resource scarcity across Africa. Russia is increasingly seeking to blame the West’s sanctions for the growing impacts.

‘Western and Ukrainian propaganda that accuses Russia of allegedly ‘exporting hunger’ is completely groundless… the “collective West” has monopolized commodity and supply flows during the Covid-19 pandemic, worsening the situation for food imports in developing countries that has been further exacerbated by sanctions imposed against Russia,” CNN quotes a letter from Lavrov during his visit to African countries.’

Russian president Vladimir Putin has gone further, blaming the shortages and market disruptions on the West’s response to the pandemic and on the West’s ‘green agenda’, which he suggests prejudices developing nations.

‘First, the situation with the global food market did not become worse yesterday or even with the launch of Russia’s special military operation in Donbass, in Ukraine,’ Putin said during an interview with Rossiya TV, a Russian media outlet.

These narratives have been amplified by pro-Russian networks across Africa, coupled with a wave of Russian announcements of ‘donations’ and other aid diplomacy, including:

1. Wheat shipments to Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) that are framed as relief packages for the food crisis situation, with suggestions that more aid will come as the country’s relationship with Russia deepens.
2. Public promises for similar food/fuel/fertilizer aid to countries such as Burundi and Ethiopia. The announcements were made during revived local celebrations for former Soviet celebrations such as Victory Day, that have been repurposed to spotlight Russia’s role as an ally against ‘Nazis’ and colonial forces.
3. Local media outlets in Somalia reported that Vladimir Putin has expressed his scepticism after Ukraine’s president said that tons of grain from his country will arrive in the coming weeks in Somalia, where famine approaches, and where the global crises of food security and climate change put millions at risk.
4. Converting historic debt into ‘aid’, for example writing off Ethiopia’s debt of $162 million to Russia as a ‘debt for development’ package.
5. Increased visits to Africa by Russian diplomats, including a high-level tour of the DRC, Ethiopia, Egypt and Uganda by Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov.
6. Pushing out existing military interventions (like the French military in Mali), with Wagner replacing them in African countries.
7. Placement of op-ed articles and other pro-Russian content in mainstream media across the continent, including significant coverage in countries such as Ethiopia and Ghana.
8. An increase in Russian embassy amplification of the core narratives in countries such as Ethiopia and Ghana.

At least some of the networks promoting Russian aid in Sudan, often through the Wagner Group and its now-confirmed founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, have been removed by Meta for using inauthentic profiles, pages, and groups to amplify content.

The U.S. and European nations have rejected the claims that spiraling food/resource costs are unrelated to the Ukraine war, with US Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, telling CNN on 03 August 2022 that: ‘there are no sanctions on any agricultural products from Russia. So, it is completely a disinformation campaign in which Russia does not want to accept responsibility for what they have done to international food markets across the continent of Africa’.

CAR: Tracking Russian cereal delivery

On 08 August 2022, we identified a Facebook post made by account 236 Actu indicating that a cereal shipment was donated by Russia to the people of CAR and was a first convoy of humanitarian assistance to help vulnerable populations. The post claims the shipment is transiting through Cameroon, and includes at least 500 tonnes of cereals.

Three days earlier, on 05 August 2022, Ndjonisango, a pro-Russian media outlet, had reported that Russia had confirmed that 540 tonnes of yellow peas would arrive in Cameroon, and were due to be delivered to CAR a few days later. On 26 August 2022, the Russian embassy in CAR had announced a delivery of ~540 tons of yellow peas, as part of food aid donations to the CAR by Russian diplomat Alexander Bikantov. The Russian ambassador’s Facebook pages in CAR and Senegal posted images of the shipment having arrived in CAR as part of the UN World Food Program.

Sample posts with content about the Russian aid delivery to CAR. (Source: CfA using Facebook)

The supposed new shipment follows earlier reports of the Russia-linked Wagner Group donating food to the Bangui and Bimbo regions of CAR in June 2021. That initial donation was accompanied by a press release from the Wagner Group through a pro-Russian local media outlet, Ndjoni Sango, attributing the donation to ‘Evgenii Prigozhin’.

Screengrab from food aid donation in CAR. (Source:NdjoniSango /CfA)

The overt use of Russian branding rather than Wagner branding cements the tie between security operations and humanitarian aid.

Ethiopia: Russia ‘debt for development’ package

On 28 July 2022, the Ethiopian deputy prime minister, Demeke Mekonnen said that Russia had supported the development efforts of Ethiopia by cancelling the 162 million dollar debt the country owed to the former Soviet Union and turning it into a ‘Debt for Development’ package.

According to the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), the package will be used to modernise Melka Wakena Hydroelectric Power and improve the capacity of Balcha Hospital, among other projects.

On 28 July 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) announced that Russia has turned Ethiopia’s debt worth 162 million USD into an aid package for development.

A post about this debt relief on the Ethiopian press agency’s Facebook page generated ~2,000 social interactions. An analysis of the comments showed that the majority of the users praised Russia for this move.

Facebook posts with high interaction rate on this story. (Source: CfA using CrowdTangle)

Multiple countries: Tracking alleged Russian ‘stolen Ukrainian grain’

The New York Times (NYT) reported on 05 June 2022 that Russian cargo vessels were leaving ports near Ukraine laden with what was described as ‘stolen Ukrainian grain’ headed towards 14 countries, most of which are, reportedly, in Africa. As the NYT did not release its sources nor provide access to the data related to the cargo vessels, CfA used Open Source Investigation Techniques (OSINT) and vessel tracking technologies to monitor African ports in an attempt to identify and report on any vessels that departed from Russia to African countries.

Possible wheat delivery to Mombasa port in Kenya

We identified one ship (Dulce Diva) that sailed from Novorossiysk port in Russia to Mombasa, Kenya. Dulce Diva (IMO: 9852755) is a bulk carrier currently sailing under the flag of Marshall Islands. Dulce Diva falls under the Dry bulk/Ultramax segment, which normally contains shipments of iron ore, coal, and grain.

Picture of Dulce Diva vessel (Source: MarineTraffic/CfA)

According to public data from MarineTraffic, confirmed with matching data from VesselFinder, the vessel departed from Novorossiysk, Russia on 2022–05–29 and arrived in Mombasa, Kenya at 08:44 LT (UTC +3) 2022–06–17 21:58 LT (UTC +3).

Dulce Diva’s route between Russia and Kenya. (Source: CfA using MarineTraffic)

Dulce Diva headed back to Tuapse, Russia on 19 August 2022, 07:18 LT (UTC +3) local time.

Possible wheat delivery to Cape Town port in South Africa

We identified one Reefer ship (Baltic Jasmine) that sailed from St. Petersburg port, Russia to Cape Town, South Africa.

Picture of Baltic Jasmine vessel (Source: MarineTraffic/CfA)

As at 17 June 2022, the vessel was docked at Cape Town after a voyage of 18 days and 10 hours, originating from St. Petersburg port. Baltic Jasmine is a refrigerated cargo ship typically used to transport perishable cargo which requires temperature-controlled handling, such as fruits, meat, vegetables, dairy products, and similar items.

Baltic Jasmine’s route between Russia and South Africa. (Source: MarineTraffic/CfA)

Possible wheat delivery to Egyptian ports

As at 17 June 2022, we identified a total of 10 vessels that came from Russian ports, and heading to Egyptian ports:

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Port Said

• Bulk Carrier Ventura departed from Murmansk, Russia on 2022–06–06 13:09 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to PORT SAID, EG on 2022–06–24 21:52 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Bulk Carrier ATLANTIC B departed from Murmansk, Russia on 2022–05–22 04:10 LT and arrived to PORT SAID, EG at 2022–07–04 07:50 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Bulk Carrier Marijeannie departed from Murmansk, Russia on 2022–06–14 07:48 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to PORT SAID, EG at 2022–07–04 20:11 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Oil/Chemical Tanker Crown II departed from Novorossiysk, Russia on 2022–06–14 02:54 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to PORT SAID, EG at 2022–06–19 03:00 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Bulk Carrier BR Victory departed from Novorossiysk, Russia on 2022–06–14 16:40 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to SUEZ CANAL at 2022–06–20 08:34 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Crude Oil Tanker ODESSA departed from Primorsk, Russia on 2022–06–03 13:31 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to PORT SAID at 2022–06–19 22:16 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Crude Oil Tanker NISSOS PAROS departed from Primorsk, Russia on 2022–06–04 20:02 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to PORT SAID at 2022–06–22 21:20 LT (UTC +3) local time

Suez Canal

• Bulk Carrier SHAIL AL DUKHAN departed from Murmansk, Russia on 2022–05–13 03:01 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to SUEZ CANAL, at 2022–06–21 06:55 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Crude Oil Tanker PINTUS departed from Primorsk, Russia on 2022–06–08 19:08 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to SUEZ CANAL at 2022–06–25 14:33 LT (UTC +3) local time
• Crude Oil Tanker KOROLEV PROSPECT departed from PRIMORSK, RU on 2022–05–19 15:47 LT (UTC +3) and arrived to SUEZ CANAL, EG at 2022–06–18 22:51 LT (UTC +3) local time.

Other African ports

As at 19 August 2022 we identified a total of 15 vessels currently docking on other African ports:

• Four vessels on Tunisian ports
• Three vessels on Algerian ports
• Two vessels on Moroccan ports
• One vessel in each of the following ports: Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti

Mali: Russian promise for infrastructural and food aid

On 27 May 2022, we identified a spike in social media coverage after a Malian government mission visited Russia, and was promised wheat, hydrocarbons and intra-agricultural trade. According to the posts seen on social media, the ministerial delegation also negotiated with Russian partners on the acquisition of three new locomotives and the repair of another two railway locomotives.

A Russian technical team is expected in Mali to assess two broken locomotives. The narrative generated a total of 434 posts on Facebook, which garnered 89,068 social interactions with the majority of the users being supportive of the announcement of aid and infrastructural support from Russia.

Screengrab of the most viral posts around the cooperation between Mali and Russia on acquiring new locomotives. (Source: Facebook, CrowdTangle/CfA)

This comes after local Malian news outlet, Mali Actu, reported that Russia has sent humanitarian supply freights to Mali at least three times in 2022. The first report was in January 2022. The second was published March 2022, with a press release dated 26 February. The second report was published May 2022 with a press release dated 12 May 2022. These press releases do not bear any affiliation to any government agency or media house: They only bear the flags of the two countries and their content is in French with the heading ‘COOPERATION DE LA FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE ET DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU MALI’’.

Press releases from Mali Actu. (source: CfA via Mali Actu)

Burundi: Russian promise of wheat delivery to Burundi

On 10 May 2022, two independent local media outlets in Burundi reported on statements from the Russian Ambassador Valery Mikhaylov during Russia’s 09 May victory day celebrations, promising the delivery of fuel, fertilisers and foodstuffs to the East African country. The statements from the Russian representative come against the backdrop of local shortages of these goods in Burundi. These diplomatic statements also provided a platform for the ambassador to reinforce prevalent narratives that the economic impacts of the war on Ukraine stemmed from Western sanctions rather than the invasion itself as per common news coverage.

Though media coverage and social media engagement with this news has been poor, the statements themselves demonstrate a continued deployment of strategic aid diplomacy by Russia across the African continent that requires close, continual observation.

Social media comments observed on Facebook posts related to the topic indicate that the majority of the users have been supportive of the donation from Russia.

We continue to monitor travel logs of vessels originating from Russia destined for Burundi, to validate the promises from the Russian ambassador.

Screengrab from IWACU showing Valery Mikhaylov announcement of the aid promise. (Source: Iwacu, Twitter, Facebook/CfA)

Sudan: Tracking Russian wheat delivery

Sudanese media reported on 06 March 2022 that Russia had delivered a shipment of 20,000 tonnes of wheat. The shipment landed at Port Sudan, and was described at a public ceremony by Russian ambassador, Vladimir Zheltov, as a ‘friendship gift’ to the country. This particular shipment was first mentioned on 01 February 2022 and was referenced again when the deputy head of Sudan’s ruling council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo announced his visit to Moscow on 23 February 2022. The official statement declared that the visit and the shipment are part of an agreement between the two countries to ‘strengthen the existing cooperation between Russia and Sudan in various fields’. The shipment was formally received by Sudan’s Red Sea State deputy governor Fathalla Al-Haj and National Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Najm-Eddin Musa.

The wheat shipment to Sudan was mentioned in 1,024 posts on Facebook, garnering a total of 158,768 social interactions. The posts with the highest interaction rate were by Sudan Tribune (سودان تربيون) and (السودان حديثا), with the majority of the users who commented on the post being critical of the news about the shipment. Noteworthy narratives included the view that Sudan’s current economic challenges are structural and won’t be fixed by one-off foreign ‘gifts’. Multiple commentators also suggested that Russia’s gift might negatively impact Sudan’s foreign relations with European or North American countries. The wheat shipment was also reported in other Sudanese media, including Alsudani news and Alrakoba.

Screengrab from Sky News’ video of the shipment arrival shows the banner on the shipment “from the people of Russia to their friends in Sudan, our friendship is tested by time”. (Source: Sky News Arabia/CfA)

Sky News Arabia (a joint venture between the UK-based Sky Group and UAE-based Abu Dhabi Media Investment Corporation) broadcast a video report about the shipment on 08 March 2022, featuring Ambassador Zheltov saying it is ‘the first of many future projects’. As at 12 April 2022, the video had attracted 6,459 views with 124 likes and 33 comments, many with pro-Russian sentiment, but with a notable number questioning motives of both Russia and the Sudanese government.

The shipment could be worth roughly $8.3 million, calculated using the Reuters spot price of $415/tonne.

The evidence

To confirm whether there was an actual shipment of wheat from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to Port Sudan in Sudan, CfA used OSINT and vessel tracking technologies and identified the ship that did the delivery, as well as its port of origin, route and the destination port.

None of the official communiqués name the ship, nor state whether the shipment contravened either global or local trade sanctions on Russian exports. While there are sanctions against Russian ships in some NATO-aligned countries, there is not yet any prohibition on either wheat exports or third party ships carrying non-sanctioned cargo. It is unclear at this stage whether the wheat delivered to Sudan may have originated from an entity named in sanction lists.

Screengrab of a list of sanctions that specifically target Russian-registered ships. There are prohibitions on non-Russian ships carrying Russian cargo. (Source Reuters.com/CfA)

The Sky News video, however, included a glimpse of the ship name, Princess Manissa, during the ceremony.

Screengrab from the video of the shipment arrival shows the ship name. (Source: skynewsarabia/CfA)

Princess Manissa (IMO: 9084217) is a bulk carrier built in 1994 currently sailing under the flag of St Kitts Nevis, and is owned by Manissa Maritime Ltd (registered in Belize in August 2021), and operated by VRS Maritime Services Ltd (registered in Dubai in the UAE). The International Maritime Risk Rating Agency (IMRRA) has risk rated VRS Maritime for some of the other bulk cargo carriers it operates. An adverse risk rating means that IMRRA assessors have recommended that the owners take immediate action to address security or safety concerns filed by port operators or other marine stakeholders. VRS Maritime vessels were rated as high risk for severe incidents/casualties.

Prior to sailing under the name Princess Manissa, the ship operated as Bau Yun and was registered in Panama.

According to public data from ShipExplorer, confirmed with matching data from VesselFinder and MarineTraffic, from 21 February Princess Manissa spent 42 hours in Novorossiysk port in Russia (situated between the occupied territories of Crimea in Ukraine and Abkhazia in Georgia). Novorossiysk is the largest cargo port in Russia. Princess Manissa sailed from Novorossiysk through the Bosphorus on 25 February without stopping, docking briefly at Port Said in Egypt on 28 February for two hours, before departing for Port Sudan in Sudan. It docked for slightly over 13 days in Port Sudan, starting on 05 March at 11:35 UTC. The data indicates Princess Manissa then departed to Egypt, docking in Suways (Suez) on 18 March for 22 hours, before returning to Port Sudan on 25 March.

Princess Manissa’s route between Russia and Sudan. (Source MarineTraffic/CfA)

Princess Manissa is, at the time of this report, located in the Gulf of Aden destined for the UAE port of Khor Fakkan in the Emirate of Sharjah.

Other shipments to Sudan

Our media monitoring database and social listening tools find no other mentions of wheat (or other) shipments from Russia into Sudan after the start of the Ukraine war. We also haven’t detected any other media mentions of similar Russian donations in the other 20 African countries that ADDO currently monitors.

Open source data indicates that 180 ships arrived in Port Sudan in the month of April. While 32 of these ships were ‘bulk carriers’ similar to Princess Manissa, none were Russian registered. And, open source data suggests that no other non-Russian ships docked in Port Sudan from Novorossiysk over the same period of time.

Following the economic impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Africa, we’ve observed that Russia has beefed up the use of aid diplomacy and other methods of soft power to foster positive public relations with low-income African countries. The tactic, of either delivering or promising to deliver aid, has been demonstrated by Russia in various African countries including Sudan, CAR, and most recently Burundi. It is worth noting that these countries respectively abstained and voted against Russia’s suspension from the UNHCR, highlighting a level of bilateral relations.

Get more information at disinfo.africa

This report is part of an ongoing series that analyses influence operations and disinformation across Africa. The research is produced by teams of analysts at ADDO partner institutions, including the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab and Code for Africa’s CivicSignal media monitoring lab, iLAB forensic investigation unit and PesaCheck fact-checking team.

This report was co-written by CfA senior investigative manager Allan Cheboi and editor-in-chief Justin Arenstein, based on forensic analysis by CfA’s investigative analysts Anita Igbine, Christian Ngnie, Eliud Akwei, Lujain Alsedeg and with additional context by researchers GodsGift Uzor and Dawit Hassen.

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