Anti-French narratives shaping public discourse in Chad
Europe-based pan-Africanist influencers partner with FACT to coordinate anti-French campaigns.
Russia's heightened efforts to assert its influence in Africa have attracted significant attention, with reports indicating a growing presence of Russian activity in Chad. Given Chad’s position in the Sahel and Central Africa region and its proximity to countries where Wagner is known to have a substantial presence, such as the Central African Republic (CAR) and Libya, these reports carry some credibility. The presence of rebel groups in Chad and the country’s relative instability further increases its susceptibility to such influences.
The local media’s increased coverage of Russia is reflected in the social media campaigns, which mainly seek to sway the public’s opinion in favour of Russia. These efforts capitalise on a pre-existing groundswell of dissatisfaction for the current transitional government led by Chad’s president Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno and, by extension, France.
Some of our noteworthy findings include:
- Prominent pan-Africanist influencers such as Kemi Seba, Nathalie Yamb and Franklin Nyamisi were instrumental in driving anti-French sentiment and narratives in Chad.
- Persons purporting to be members of rebel groups such as FACT were significant drivers of some of the anti-French narratives. Facebook pages and groups associated with these groups serve as avenues for pushing these narratives.
- Dark socials have become a breeding ground for disseminating disinformation, as we observed that a lot of the disinformation activities are driven on Telegram.
- A surge in the emergence of social movements that aim to promote cultural exchange and cooperation between Chad and Russia.
- The October 2022 violence which led to numerous deaths was followed by major spikes in the anti-regime and anti-French narratives.
- The presence of Wagner in Chad’s neighbouring countries is a huge concern as the alleged Wagner involvement in Chad is not far-fetched. There appear to be connections between FACT and Wagner making the possibility even more substantial.
Vulnerability assessment
This section analyses Chad’s vulnerability to outside influence, using CfA’s Vulnerability Index toolkit, co-developed with the DFRLab. The Index measures resource dedication indicators, weighted per population alongside citizens’ access to information/media resources, to calculate a country’s susceptibility to propaganda or influence operations.
Between January-December 2022, Chad was among the 12 countries that witnessed an increase in vulnerability, marking a shift from its previous trend of declining vulnerability. The rise can be attributed to the intensified coverage and reporting of events in Chad by Russian-affiliated media, coupled with a growing consumption of Russian-related content by the Chadian people. In September 2022, Chad ranked 12th out of 21 countries, with an index of 2.99. In 2023, this index increased to 3.28 elevating Chad to the 11th position. The upswing in media and social media activity, as shown below, validates the index ranking.
Information catalysts
CfA uses three sets of ‘signals’ to understand local information ecosystems: we measure mainstream media coverage as an indicator of what information gatekeepers are prioritising; we undertake social media ‘listening’ to track what influencers are amplifying; and we measure internet search trends as an indicator for what topics ordinary (online) citizens are proactively researching.
Mainstream media assessment
This section outlines how Chad and wider regional mainstream media are reporting on Russia-related topics, including timelines indicating spikes in coverage linked to specific events.
CfA has tracked 79 separate Chad media articles, mentioning Russia, published between 01 February 2022 — February 2023.
The analysis is based on the CfA consortium’s MediaData ecosystem mapping survey, which has profiled 51 of Chad’s most prominent news organisations. The consortium uses the separate MediaCloud machine learning toolkit to actively monitor the online platforms for 18 of these media. MediaCloud provides near-real-time detailed topic tracking/analysis, allowing our researchers to monitor coverage of topics or issues over time. The resulting data helps researchers to identify persistent pro-Russian narratives, the media and authors behind the coverage, as well as those offering counter-narratives.
Out of the newsrooms surveyed in Chad, a small portion of 5.88% are owned by the state, while the majority of 94.12% are owned by NGOs and private entities. However, the ownership information for 30% of Chad’s media sources remains unknown. MediaCloud currently monitors 18 of these news sources, while the remaining 31 sources do not have fully fledged websites and are therefore monitored using social listening tools. CfA is continually expanding its MediaData and MediaCloud mapping/monitoring as more media sources are discovered by investigative teams.
Media monitoring and machine analysis in Chad currently only uses English and French.
Social media assessment
This section outlines what Chadian social media users are sharing/discussing online, including spotlighting possible pro-Russian influence campaigns. Social media engagement often features links from media or other information sources. The trends help to identify specific inflection points or triggers, as well as particular influencers or information sources for further analysis.
According to the World Bank, about 10% of Chad’s population has access to the internet. Facebook is the most popular digital information source for these ~1.7 million Chadians, with about 91.27% of online citizens using the platform between June 2022 and February 2023, as per analysis from Statcounter. Twitter is the second most popular social media platform with just about 6.04% of social media users in Chad. Youtube, Instagram, Pinterest, and VKontakte (VK) follow with 1.24%, 0.79%, 0.54% and 0.06% respectively.
Chad’s low internet penetration contributes to its status as a blindspot in terms of identifiable instances of Russian disinformation online. This could be attributed to the failure of the disinformation playbook, employed in other Francophone countries with higher internet penetration, to suit the unique information flow dynamics in Chad.
However, the low level of internet penetration does not shield offline citizens from online disinformation. In fact, it makes them more vulnerable to the effects of this disinformation since they cannot verify the information they receive from their online counterparts. It is challenging to measure the scope of this phenomenon due to the inability of analytical tools like Statcounter to track activities on dark socials.
Despite low internet penetration in the country, engagement spikes related to offline activities are still notable. There was a spike between 20 October and 31 October 2022 caused by the violence connected to the protests against the transitional government’s decision to extend its stay in power by an additional two years.
There was a similar spike on Twitter between 15 December and 20 December 2022. The spike in mentions of Russia-related keywords was related to assertions by Nigeria’s president Muhammadu Buhari in November 2022 that weapons from the Russia-Ukraine war were smuggled into the Lake Chad region. On 16 December 2022, conversations about Buhari’s comment resurfaced, causing a spike.
Google search trends assessment
This section outlines trends relating to Chadians’ interest in Russia-related searches on Google (which is the dominant search engine in Chad) as an indicator of how combined media and social media content exposure may be shaping the average person’s perceptions.
Between 19–25 September 2021, there was a significant spike in searches for ‘Wagner’ following claims that the military company was headed to neighbouring Mali. After the outbreak of war in Eastern Europe, the terms ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’ triggered another spike, surpassing all previous interests in Russia. In mid to late December, there was a significant spike in the search for the terms ‘Russia’ and ‘France’ due to claims that France had tried to assassinate the head of the Russian House, Dmitry Syty, in the neighbouring Central African Republic.
Emerging tactics + techniques:
This section spotlights emerging tactics/techniques and actors involved in propagating pro-Russian messaging in Chad.
Pan-Africanist influencers driving anti-French sentiment in Chad
There, there has been an increase of ‘influencers’ from Francophone African nations such as Burkina Faso and Mali. These influencers typically have ties to Francophone Africa but are based in other parts of the world and are vocal in their opposition to French interests. Notable figures include Kemi Seba and Nathalie Yamb.
This trend has also been observed in Chad, where there was a coordinated effort to amplify an original Facebook post by Namb, a Cameroonian-Swiss activist who is widely perceived to be pro-Russian.
A cell of 34 Facebook accounts used the copy-paste technique to amplify Yamb’s post, which suggested that France and its president, Emmanuel Macron, were to be blamed for the violence that erupted in Chad, leading to the death of more than 50 people. On Twitter, 58 accounts amplified another post with similar claims.
The violence, which occurred in Chad’s capital city of N’Djamena and other major towns, started on 20 October 2022. It was reportedly sparked by protests against president Déby Itno’s decision to extend his rule for another two years. Déby Itno had originally been scheduled to step down on the same date the violence erupted but he announced his extension earlier in October 2022.
On 20 October 2022, a French journalist who claims his wife and son are Chadian gave an interview to the French news site Le Media. During the interview, posted on YouTube, the journalist suggested that Macron may have played a role in the unrest that occurred in Chad. Although the journalist does not fit the mould of the typical “influencer” we have previously identified, his familial connection to Chad is noteworthy. The video has been shared 1,711 times by 58 distinct Twitter accounts, primarily in Burkina Faso and France. The accompanying captions all read ‘Chad: Macron accomplice in a mass crime’.
There was also an amplification of a Facebook livestream by Franklin Nyamsi on 20 October 2022. In the livestream, Nyamisi stated that Deby Itno’s regime, which was carrying out a massacre of the Chadian people, was sponsored into power by France. The stream was posted on five Facebook pages and shared in 189 Facebook groups. Typical of the influencers, Nyamsi is originally Cameroonian but is based in France, where he teaches at the University of Rouen.
Activities of social movements
As mentioned earlier, there has been an increase in the establishment of pro-Russia and anti-France/Western social movements in some Francophone African countries. These movements claim to promote cooperation and cultural exchange between Russia and the countries in which they are based.
Five unique accounts posted eight times on Facebook about the launch in Chad of an organisation called the Association for Cooperation and Socio-Cultural Development with Russia (ASCODER). According to a report by a news site in Chad, ASCODER’s goal is to bring together the Russian speaking community in Chad, and to promote Russia-Chad cooperation. During the launch on 13 January 2023 at the Media House, the association’s president Dr. Doumbe Achim said ASCODER would focus on facilitating cultural exchange between Chad and Russia while advocating for common values.
Achim studied Agricultural Science at the Saint-Petersburg State Agrarian University (SPbSAU) and is the coordinator of horticultural projects at the ministry in charge of agriculture.
Transition to Dark Socials
Anti-French posts were shared on Telegram, a few Facebook pages, and various Facebook groups. On 2 October 2022, an opinion piece signed by a person who claims to be a FACT fighter, was shared in a Telegram channel. The piece accused France of supporting an alleged dictatorial regime in Chad. The piece was also posted by two Facebook pages of Chadian media outlets. Subsequently, the Facebook post was shared in 15 other Facebook groups. Similarly, on 7 October 2022, the alleged fighter shared another piece in a Telegram channel and on the Facebook page of a Chadian media outlet. The post, which essentially requested that Macron desists from using the French army to assist Deby in brutalising the Chadian youth fighting for freedom, was subsequently shared into 32 groups.
The trail of these Telegram posts reveals another layer to the disinformation playbook, where influencers share posts in private channels that cannot be easily tracked. Though we are aware that it happens it is very difficult to monitor.
Amplification pieces allegedly authored by a FACT rebel fighter
A piece allegedly written by the alleged FACT fighter in response to Macron’s speech, that Russia had to accept that it can not impose its will by using military force and conducting “sham referendums”, was shared by nine Facebook pages. The response piece follows Macron’s sentiments, on the Russia-Ukraine war, during the United Nations (UN) General Assembly that was held on 20 September 2022.
In his response piece, alleged fighter of FACT, likened Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to France’s involvement in Chad, accusing Macron of double standards. He also alleges that France has consistently been using military force to rescue Deby Itno’s regime from rebel attacks and that France is the only country whose presence in former colonies keeps sparking controversy. The piece also described Mahamat Mahdi Ali, the leader of FACT, as a learned person whose goal is to put Chad on a democratic path.
Counter-terrorism deal between Russia and Chad in the offing
The claims that Chad and Russia were working on a counter-terrorism deal was a narrative that could be used to drive Russian disinformation. The claim was first mentioned on 24 February 2023, by a Twitter account based in Benin. The narrative fed into Russian propaganda that France had failed to protect the citizens of Chad from terrorists and rebels, hence the need to turn to Russia for assistance, as observed in other countries in the Sahel. The narrative gathered traction, with the patient zero tweet receiving ~28,500 views and 291 interactions, which were mostly unsupportive of the purported deal.
The only tweet about the deal which was supportive of Russia was from a Twitter user who describes himself as a research analyst. The account claimed that the connection between Wagner Group and the rebel group FACT, which is said to be responsible for the killing of Chad’s former president, was part of a ploy by the US to disrupt the deal between Chad and Russia.
In a 23 February 2023 article by the Wall Street Journal, Yevgeny Prigozhin declined to respond to questions on the allegations of links between Wagner and FACT as well as claims that Wagner provides logistical and operational support to FACT in their efforts to destabilise Chad’s transitional government. The WSJ also asked Prigozhin about Wagner’s relationship with another Chadian rebel group, the Union of Republican Forces (USF).
Amplified narratives
This section examines the meta’ narratives that are being amplified, citing specific examples. The section lists the most noteworthy incidents or narratives chronologically, with the most recent first.
Anti-French and anti-Macron narratives
A Chadian journalist tweeted on 23 November 2022, alleging that Déby Itno’s soldiers were killing citizens in Krim Krim and that these activities of “the junta”, supported by Paris, amounted to terrorism. The post received 291 retweets and 648 likes. Five Facebook pages copy-pasted the tweet and shared it across 12 Facebook groups.
A message on a pan-Africanist Telegram channel alleged that the colourful umbrellas used as decoration at the Dary Festival in Chad, which were associated with the LGBTQ community due to their colours, were funded by France under the supervision of the French ambassador to Chad. A total of 438 people viewed the post. Before the festival started, several articles reported on the backlash the umbrellas had caused as they were perceived as promoting the LGBTQ agenda.
According to the Facebook page of a Chadian media outlet, the festival organisers took down the umbrellas stating that the umbrellas were suggested by sponsors of the festival. The Dary Festival was held in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital, between 24 December 2022 and 21 January 2023 and aims to promote cultural integration between Chadians.
The same pan-Africanist Telegram channel and its Facebook page posted about the 6th G5 summit held in Chad on 20 February 2023. These posts claimed that Macron had installed Déby and Muhammed Bazum as heads of state of Chad and Niger. These posts also accused France of supporting and financing terrorism while claiming to fight against it and stated that the two presidents cannot fight against France. The summit participants included Niger’s president Bazum, Mauritania’s president Mohammed Old Al-Ghazwani, and Colonel Kacem Coulibaly, defence minister for Burkina Faso.
20 October 2022 protests and aftermath
On 17 October 2022, on Telegram, the alleged FACT fighter called on people to promote the protest against the extension of Deby Itno’s tenure. The protest was scheduled for 20 October 2022. The image accompanying the post read, “FACTS supports the people of Chad for the 20 October protest”. The image was also posted on Facebook, urging people to turn out in numbers for the protest.
As indicated in the Influencer Opinions section, the October 2022 protest saw more than 50 people killed as the government claimed the protestors were violent. These protests were sparked by the decision to extend Déby’s tenure two years in the same month he was originally billed to step down.
CfA’s analysis identified nine copy-pasted Facebook posts, claiming that gunmen were kidnapping people from their homes and torturing them after killing over 80 Chadiens during the 20 October 2022 protests. The 23 October 2023 posts also asserted that France was providing Déby Itno’s regime with weapons in exchange for oil and that the alleged brutalities against Chadiens were done with France’s blessing. FACTS also released a statement signed by Issa Ahmat, deputy commissioner for Communication and Awareness and Citizen Mobilization, condemning the brutalities.
Wagner’s presence in Chad
According to THE GREY ZONE: Russia’s military, mercenary and criminal engagement in Africa, a report by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Wagner’s strategy in Africa is segmented into three parts: military, political and economic.
The military strategy is Wagner’s mercenary activities which it is mostly known for. Wagner’s military interventions in countries like CAR, Mali and Libya have been well documented, including alleged involvement in overthrowing autocratic regimes in Francophone African countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, which were perceived to be backed by their former colonial masters like France. Wagner has also been heavily involved in protecting these governments from the activities of extremists.
The political strategy involves Wagner proffering advice on strategy to political leaders and influencing elections.
The economic strategy involves Wagner’s interest in various sectors in some African countries, including mining. In December 2022, Nana Akuffo-Addo, president of Ghana, claimed that Burkina Faso had given Russian mercenaries a mine in exchange for assistance to fight terrorists.
Chad’s relative instability due to the activities of rebels like FACTS and the perception that France backs the current government led by Déby primes the country for intervention by Wagner. According to Chadian officials, there was an attempt to overthrow the transitional government in early December 2022 but it was foiled. However, the media did not report The failed coup attempt until January 2023. According to Western intelligence agencies cited in The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article published on 13 February 2023, Wagner is training Christian rebels in Chad. In response to this allegation and eight other questions posed by the WSJ, Prigozhin called the query ‘nonsense’ and referred the publication to the Financial Times. Prigozhin’s comments were published on the Wagner press Telegram channel, ‘Press service of Prigozhin’ and received ~111,800 views. The response was also published on Prigozhin’s Hat, another Wagner Telegram channel, where it received ~152,800 views.
Prigozhin responded similarly on 22 February 2023 when he was questioned by the WSJ about Wagner’s involvement in CAR and Libya, as well as the military company’s connection to the rebel group FACT and the killing of the former president of Chad Idriss Déby.
Déby died in April 2021 during a battle with FACT rebels. WSJ asked Prigozhin about the alleged collaboration between FACT and Wagner, stating that FACT rebels had fought alongside Wagner fighters in Libya and that Wagner continues providing them with logistical and operational support to destabilise Chad’s transitional regime. They also asked about Wagner’s relationship with another Chadian rebel group, the Union of Republican Forces (URF).
The FACT leader, Mahamat Mahdi Ali, has denied any recent links between his group and Wagner. In a 24 February 2022 article published by RFI, Ali stated that FACT had fought alongside Wagner and other European forces against Daesh in Libya, and suggested that if there had been any opportunity for collaboration with Wagner during Déby’s death in April 2021, it would have happened then. An audio, purported to be excerpts of Mahamat Mahdi Ali’s interview with RFI was amplified on Facebook by 16 pages.
However, on 20 February 2022, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, Chad’s foreign minister, told Sputnik and Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti that Chad requires Russia’s assistance in fighting terrorism. Additionally, the new Russian ambassador to Chad, Vladimir Sokolenko, told RIA Novosti that Russia and Chad seek to bolster cooperation across multiple sectors, including enhancing technical and military cooperation since approximately 80% of Chad’s weaponry is produced by Russia.
On 16 March 2023, Prigozhin’s response to questions from a New York Times reporter, Declan Walsh, was posted on ‘Press service of Prigozhin’ — a Wagner Group Telegram channel. The post received 163,300 views. The response was also posted on five pro-Wagner Telegram channels, including ‘Prigozhin’s hat’, receiving a total of ~172,700 views. The questions were based on allegations that the US had alerted the current president of Chad of an apparent assassination plot against him. In his response, Prigozhin denied the reports of Wagner’s links with Chadian rebels and accused the reporter of being a ‘petty provocateur’. Walsh’s report was published by the New York Times on 19 March 2023 and suggested the US told the Chadian government of Russia’s imminent threat.
On 21 April 2023, Wagner Group’s leader, Prigozhin’s comments in response to a query by a journalist from the Washington Post were posted on Wagner’s press Telegram channel, ‘Press service of Prigozhin’. The post received ~107,800 views. The posts were also copy-pasted onto pro-Wagner Telegram channels, ‘Prigozhin’s Hat’, ‘Yakov Kedmi’ and ‘Putin on Telegram’ and received a total of ~265,000 views. The Washington Post’s query cited the April 2023 Discord leaks, which described alleged plans by Wagner to topple Chad’s government. The leaks on the gaming platform, Discord, contain several classified military documents, including links to CIA briefings. In his response, Prigozhin failed to reply to the question directly but instead attacked the journalist. Subsequently, on 24 April 2023, the Washington Post published an article with Prigozhin’s comments. Reactions to the article were primarily from US-based entities.
Conclusion
The analysis above shows how Russia has been exploiting the situation in Chad by creating and spreading anti-French sentiments. Although the narratives are mostly anti-French, the drivers are somewhat linked to Russia (in the case of the influencers) or Wagner (in the case of the rebels — FACTS).
The use of dark socials as a primary channel for spreading disinformation to the public continues due to the privacy it provides. It is possible that Russia had a role in influencing significant occurrences such as the October 2022 protests, as FACTS was directly involved.
This report was co-written by CfA iLab investigation manager Allan Cheboi, iLab investigation analyst Eliud Akwei, iLab managing editor Athandiwe Saba, and CfA editor-in-chief Justin Arenstein.
